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Abstract 
On February 17th 2008 Kosovo declared its independence, thus seceding from the 
Republic of Serbia. Prior to the declaration of independence a series of events, 
notably the NATO intervention in 1999, had involved the international society and 
especially the European Union deeply in the future status of Kosovo, with both 
interests and prestige at stake in resolving the last conflict in the Balkan region. 
The EU’s latest answer to the Kosovarian claim of independence was to 
recommend its member states a conditional recognition of Kosovo, dependent 
upon Kosovar compliance to a comprehensive series of conditionalities 
propounded by the Union.    
State recognition is both a legal and political act. Therefore, this paper investigates 
the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo by analyzing the relation between 
various ideas of international law and practice of state recognition, and the strategy 
behind the EU‘s  conditional recognition of Kosovo. Thus, it is the aim of this 
paper to shed light on the strategy and logic behind the EU’s conditional 
recognition of Kosovo through an interdisciplinary study based on theories of 
international relations and international law.           
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2.0 Research field 
2.1 Kosovo: the declaration of independence  
The Kosovarian road towards the declaration of independence has been characterized 
by decades of conflict between Kosovo-Albanian separatists and the armed forces of 
the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and later Serbian military forces. In 1999 
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 that put Kosovo under UN 
administration which effectively came to mean that Belgrade no longer had any 
control of the province (UN:1999). The United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) established a variety of local interim authorities and institutions including 
an official parliament and presidency and began establishing a Kosovarian police 
force, legal system and other administrative organs providing Kosovo great 
autonomy within the territorial borders of Serbia (ibid). 
  
In spring 2007 the UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari delivered a draft status 
proposal to the respective leaders in Pristina and Belgrade proposing ‘supervised 
independence’ for Kosovo. While not suggesting independence per se, it gave the 
Kosovo Assembly the right to create a law on Kosovo citizenship, adopt national 
symbols and create a Kosovarian security force (UN, 2007: Annex XII, Article 2).    
The Kosovo declaration of independence was adopted by the Kosovo Assembly on 
17 February 2008 and approved by an unanimous vote: 
 
“We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be 
an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people 
and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.” 
(Kosovo Assembly, article 1, 17 February 2008)  
 
Following the declaration of independence, the international society once again faced 
the question of state recognition and secession in the light of the events of the civil 
war in ex-Yugoslavia and the Kosovo/Serbian conflict. On 18 February 2008 the 
Council of the European Union took notice of Kosovos declaration of independence, 
attaining the lowest common denominator in its stand; that Kosovo constitutes a sui 
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generis1 from where the member states were to decide on their recogniton of Kosovo 
in compliance with national and international law and practice (European 
Commission).  
   
2.2 International Recognition   
Kosovo has this far been recognized by 60 states (Kosovothanksyou). The 
discussions regarding the possible consequences of the recognition of Kosovo have 
encouraged seperatist movements striving for independence around the world. Just 
after the declaration, the Basque seperatists greeted the act followed by several other 
seperatist movements such as the Kashmiri, the Tibetian, Taiwanese, Kurdish, 
Transdeniestrian et. al. (Reuters, 2008). Three weeks after the Kosovo declaration of 
independence, Abkhazia and South Ossetia demanded international recognition, 
Nagorno-Karabakh stated that  “the recognition of independent Kosovo will become 
an additional factor strengthening the status of [the] Stepanakert government" 
(NKR:2008) while Palestine declared that “Kosovo is no better than us”(BBC:2009). 
The fear of setting precedent in international law that could encourage separatist 
movements around the globe, was the most common ground for states’ non 
recognition of Kosovo, which the European Union attempted to circumvent by 
characterizing Kosovo as a case of sui generis (B92, 2009).  
 
Nearly a year after the Kosovarian declaration of independence, the European Union 
finally articulated a common statement through the European Parliament. This 
happened at the assembly meeting on the status of Kosovo 5 February 2009, where it 
was agreed that the parliament “Encourages those EU member states which have not 
already done so to recognise the independence of Kosovo” (EU, 2009: article 3, 
European Role).  
 
The question of secession and state recognition in international politics is historically 
a delicate matter due to the ever-changing nature of World politics. The question of 
when a state comes into existence has been revised, discussed and conversed since 
the peace of Westphalia in 1648, as the following statement made by the British 
foreign minister Douglas Hogg in 1991 reflects;    
                                                
1  Sui generis: latin for ’of its own kind;’ hence, whatever is absolutely unique or distinctive 
about something   
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“When talking about recognition of states we have […] historical tests, and therefore 
their adherence to treaties is not a condition of recognition” (Caplan, 2005:61) 
  
As can be read from above, Douglas Hogg considered a state coming into being once 
it fulfills certain objective criteria, rather than its adherence to politically defined 
standards.  The statement, however, was revised shortly after it was articulated as the 
historical tests that Hogg’s referred to proved to be inadequate in the new context 
that had emerged with the dissolution of The Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia (ibid). 
Thus, the new states that emerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia were subjected 
to politically defined criteria. 
Through Kosovo’s secession from Serbia, the question of state recognition was 
addressed once again. The character of this conflict, however, was much different 
from the conflict following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, first and 
foremost because the creation of the new Balkan and Eastern European states 
followed the dissolution of the former communist states whereas Kosovo demanded 
secession from the still existing state of Serbia.  
 
State recognition is indeed a complex matter, as was illustrated by the incongruence 
between Serbia and Kosovo as well as in the UN security council’s defeat in 
articulating a common stand on the status of Kosovo, namely because of Russia’s 
veto right (BBC, 2007). While Serbia claimed the right of territorial integrity 
depicted in the Helsinki Final act (UN, 1975) and outlined in UN charter 1244 (UN, 
1999), Kosovo claimed the right of supervised independence as prescribed in the 
Ahtisaari Plan (UN, 2007).  
The EU, eager to solve the conflict in its own figurative backyard, legitimized its 
conditional recognition by stating that recognition and statehood would serve the best 
for Kosovo, the best for Serbia and the best for the region as a whole. The EU 
foreign ministers declared that Kosovarian independent statehood would put an end 
to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, with Kosovo as the last unresolved issue. They 
further argued, that a settlement on the status of Kosovo was crucial for securing 
regional peace and stability, and would pose a milestone for both Kosovo and for 
Serbia’s future EU integration (UN, 1999)  . The recognition was, however, attached  
to a comprehensive list of conditionalities, which had its normative foundation in the 
EU’s values and standards of governance as last depicted in the Lisbon treaty, 
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emphasizing the necessity of Kosovo’s compliance to “European values” (EULEX, 
2008b).  
The EU’s goals of settling the status of Kosovo, securing stability in the region and 
implementing the Ahtisaari plan all comes together in its conditional recognition of 
Kosovo. Thus, the act of conditional recognition can be perceived as a part of the 
strategy articulated by the Union, transforming the act of state recognition to an 
instrument used to promote the EU’s agenda. This leads us to the research question.
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3.0 Research Question 
 
To what extent is the EU's conditional recognition of Kosovo an exercise of soft 
power performed in accordance with international law? 
 
3.1 Sub‐questions 
In order to answer the research question, following sub-questions have been 
developed:  
 
- To what extend does Kosovo fulfill the obligations of a state?  
- To what extent has the EU made reference to a legal basis in its influence on the                  
development of the values that the Kosovo state is to rely upon?    
- What does the EU gain from articulating a conditional recognition of Kosovo? 
- Why have Kosovo complied with the standards set by the EU?  
 
3.2 Definitions  
This paper focuses on ‘the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo’. Therefore, 
It is necessary to define what is exactly understood when referring to the terms of 
‘EU’s conditional recognition’ and ‘Kosovo’, as to avoid any misunderstandings:  
  
 The EU’s conditional recognition: It is important to emphasize, that recognition of 
statehood is ultimately a national decision due to the fundamental sovereignty of a 
state. The EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo has therefore no binding effects 
on its members, but serves as a recommendation of recognition. Accordingly, when 
discussing the EU’s conditional recognition we do not refer to the single EU member 
states’ decision of recognition or non-recognition. Instead, we refer to the EU as a 
regional institution that through its conditional recognition of Kosovo sends a 
recommendation to its member states (EU, 2009). 
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 Kosovo: Unless noted otherwise, when reference to Kosovo is made we refer to the 
definition of Kosovo as defined in the Ahtisaari plan, defining its borders as these 
frontiers stood on 31 December 1988, and thus its population as the inhabitants of its 
area. (UN, 2007: Annex VIII article 3)  
 
3.3 Research assumptions 
The research question of this paper has been constructed upon the basis of three main 
assumptions. These assumptions are a prerequisite for our analysis to be carried out.  
 
- The EU has influenced the development of the values on which the Kosovo state is 
founded, 
- The EU’s conditional recognition can be understood in continuation hereof, and, 
- This effectively signifies that the EU is a regional leader.  
 
3.4 Research hypotheses 
The EU has a well known goal of ‘spreading European values’, as depicted in details 
in the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty (EU: 2001; 2007), by promoting incentives 
for European countries to one day become members of the Union. We perceive the 
conditional recognition of Kosovo as a similar strategy, aiming to spread European 
values by imposing conditionalities to the recognition of Kosovo. This leads us to the 
first hypothesis: 
 
1) The conditional recognition of Kosovo by the EU represents a European exercise 
of soft power. 
 
It is, however, a significantly new development that the recognition of a state is 
conditional to the adoption of certain political ideals. Therefore, we perceive soft 
power as being used in a context that has previously been dominated by a legal 
practice constraining the space for political maneuvering (Caplan, 2005: 74-79). This 
leads us to our second hypothesis:  
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2) Kosovo has been recognized upon its compliance to politically defined criteria, 
rather than upon historically defined tests. 
 
The research hypotheses are based upon empirical observations of the EU’s 
conditional recognition and the apparent Kosovarian compliance. Accordingly, they 
serve to make the research questions operational prior to a conceptualization of the 
theoretical framework that will be presented later in the paper. 
 
3.5 Delimitations 
The conflict of Kosovo includes elements of ethnic conflict, nationalism, the civil 
war in ex-Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a post-Cold 
War world order and many other factors. Despite the complexity of the case, the 
focus of this paper is specified to investigating conditional recognition as an 
instrument of soft power, and accordingly it is not the aim of this paper to capture the 
totality of the conflict. Though the field of interest is narrowed down to this specific 
focus, there are limitations to the possibilities of conducting this research.  
 
The vast amount of empirical data of possible interest combined with the limited 
time period for conducting the research, has forced us to neglect many possible 
empirical sources. In order not to collect data by pure coincidence, we have defined 
certain criteria for the selection of data (which we shall return to in section 5.2).This 
selection naturally includes a de-selection of other possible sources. 
Further, the majority of the data collected and applied in the analysis are official 
documents published either by the EU, the Kosovarian government or the UN. The 
documents reflect what these actors are willing to communicate to the outside, but 
there is no guarantee that it reflects the actual strategy pursued by the actors, nor 
what has been discussed internally.  
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3.6 Project Design 
As we find that the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo is best understood 
through an interdisciplinary approach applying both theories of international 
relations and international law, present paper is structured around thematic 
areas relating to the two disciplines divided into three chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 will function as an introduction for the reader; specifying the field 
of research, presenting the research, theses and reflections prior to an actual 
analysis 
 
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between the EU’s conditional recognition 
of Kosovo and the exercise of soft power. Firstly, the theoretical framework 
employed will be presented followed by methodological reflections in order to 
clarify how, and on which basis, conclusions have been attained. Following, 
the actual analysis will be conducted.   
 
Chapter 3 includes a discussion of the results of the analysis. We shall 
conclude on the analysis conducted and examine the quality of the results 
obtained. Finally, perspectives to alternate approaches will presented for 
further research.  
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Figure 1 
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4.0 Theoretical framework 
This study of the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo is interdisciplinary, 
drawing primarily on theoretical investigations in two fields of social science: 
international law and international relations. International law provides a general 
understanding of legal theory and insight into the practice of state recognition, while 
international relations provide explanations of the character of international politics.  
 
Scholars  have been debating the character of international law for centuries 
especially concerning one main question: is international law essentially a primitive 
and therefore deficient form of law, that only reflect the world seen through a power 
prism, or is there a any room for ideas such as ’rules’ and ’cooperation’ to be brought 
into effect (Chen 1951, Caplan 2005, Brierly 1950 and Roberts & Watts 1992). Put in 
Professor Ti-Chiang Chen’s words ”a fundamental cleavage between those who 
regard the State as the ultimate source of international rights and duties, and those 
who regards it as under a system of law [exists]” (Chen, 1951:12).  Depending upon 
the perspective it is possible to include or exclude international law as a source for 
understanding admission of new states to the international order (Caplan, 2005:74). 
We will introduce the Declaratory Theory of Statehood as depicted by Brierly and 
Chen and the Constitutive Theory of Statehood as depicted in Oppenheim’s 
international law, as representatives for the two competing perspectives, and further 
make the antagonistic perspectives on state recognition within international law 
operational for analysis.  
 
A parallel debate within international relations has taken place. Realist and liberalist 
IR scholars have for the past 50 years debated the character of state behavior and 
World politics (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007:60-62; 97-100). Realists have claimed that 
state behavior is solely subject to a logic of power (military power), that reduces 
World Politics to power politics. On the other hand, liberalists have emphasized the 
many levels they believe constitute World Politics, and the variety of different 
strategies, military as well as non-military, that the scholars believe characterizes 
international relations. Further, we shall introduce the concept of power as presented 
by the modern realist Hans Morgenthau and the neo-liberalist Joseph S. Nye, with 
special emphasis on the liberalist school and Nye’s theoretical concept of ’Soft 
Power’.  
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Finally, we shall introduce Mervyn Frost’s constitutive theory of ethics in 
international relations. Frost’s theory concerns the spreading of normative values in 
international politics, and complement Nye’s concept of soft power with guidelines 
for implementation of normative values through the use of conditional recognition of 
statehood as a soft power instrument.        
  
While the relevance of rules and cooperation has been attended in the debates of both 
international law and international relations, only recently scholars have begun to 
appreciate the complimentary effects of the disciplines. This led the International 
Relations scholar Louis Henkins to characterize the situation between these two 
disciplines as a ’Dialogue de Sourds2’ (Henkins, 1979:4). It is the goal of this paper 
to combine the theoretical explanations of international politics and state recognition 
as presented in International Relations and International Law, to shed new light on 
the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo.  
  
4.1 State Recognition – a declaratory or constitutive act? 
The academic debate on statehood recognition has been dominated by the 
antagonistic perspectives of the two main schools of thought, namely, the constitutive 
and declarative schools.  The two schools provide different characteristics of 
international law and the process of state recognition, and therefore also different 
conclusions on the possibilities and legality of conditional recognition of statehood 
that is relevant for this paper. Both schools characterize state recognition as an 
important political act that make diplomatic relations possible, but while the 
declarative school considers recognition as a declaration of the existence of the state, 
the constitutive school believes that the act of recognition constitutes the state and 
thereby brings it to existence.  
 
The central argument presented by the constitutive doctrine, as put forth by 
Oppenheim himself, is that ‘A State is, and becomes, an International Person 
through recognition only and exclusively’ (Jennings & Watts, 1992:120). 
Accordingly, a state only exists legally when recognized by other states and thereby 
confirmed in its rights and duties under international law. The juridical norms of the 
                                                
2   Translation: "a deaf people's dialogue". The expression is used to describe a situation where two persons 
engage in dialogue and keep talking back to each other without actually understanding what the other person is trying to 
say. 
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international order, which is used for deciding questions of state recognition, is 
according to Oppenheim a result of an agreement between the States of the 
international system (Jennings & Watts, 1992:14). Thus, the legal source for 
determining whether or not to recognize an aspiring state is a ‘common pact’ based 
upon the consensus of the international society of states, termed  ‘pacta sunt 
servanda3’. By subjecting state recognition to the maxim of 'pacta sunt servanda' the 
constitutive school draws heavily on references to legal positivism and Hegel (Chen, 
1951:25), who originally combined the thoughts of legal positivism and 
constitutivism and state recognition. Thus, the constitutive doctrine applies the 'pacta 
sunt servanda' as the legal source from which international law stems, and thereby 
make the option of conditional recognition possible: if an aspiring state does not 
comply with the prescripts of international law/pacta sunt servanda, it can be argued 
as illegal to recognize the state. Either way, the legal source for determining 
recognition or non-recognition is the norms and standards established in consensus 
within the international society of states.   
 
The opposite position has been promoted by the declaratory theorists, and has been 
precisely put by Hall, who argued that: “States […] are subjected to law […] from 
the moment only, at which they acquire the marks of a state” (Chen, 1951:14).  The 
act of recognition, according to Hall, therefore only declares the fact that a state has 
come into existence. It has no constitutive effect on its existence, as this would make 
the existence of States relative only to one another. Based upon this logical 
deduction, the declarative theorists conclude that once a State has satisfied certain 
objective test, which gives it the marks of a State, it ipso facto4 becomes a legal 
person in international law and thereby comes to existence. Among declaratist 
theorists a fierce debate has taken place regarding what actually constitutes 'the mark 
of a state'. Though the debate is still ongoing today, a common consensus was 
established around the definition of a state portrayed in article 1 of Montevideo 
Convention from 1933 (Chen, 1951:34) 
 
“The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; 
                                                
3   Translation: ‘A common pact’ 
4   Translation: ‘by fact’ – an expression used to signal that something has 
come to effect. 
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and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” (Paulsson, 2005:17) 
 
 
All though a debate of 'the marks of a state' still exist, the Montevideo Conventions 
article 1 has gained the status of  a commonly agreed minimum definition of a state 
within the declaratory doctrine.  Even though admitting that the constitutive theory 
has been able to provide explanations to the content of a series of international 
treaties, Chen holds that the constitutivists are unable to explain vast parts of 
international law with their maxim of ‘pacta sunt servanda’. Even the maxim itself, it 
is noted by Chen, forms a kind of superior norm, and is itself an a priori assumption, 
and accordingly cannot be the legal source for determining questions of state 
recognition (Chen, 1951:21).  
 
4.2 Summary 
The emphasis on respectively ‘objective tests’ and ‘pacta sunt servanda’ is the core 
of the disagreements between the two schools, and emerges from the underlying 
fundamental dispute of the characteristics of international law. On the one hand the 
Hegelian wedlock between positivism and constitutivism emphasizes the States and 
their agreements as the source of international law, and on the other the declaratory 
doctrine, which by its references to ‘objective tests’ forms an alliance with the 
‘natural law theory’, which emphasizes the obligatory character of international law, 
apart from the wills of individual states (Chen, 1951:18). 
 
Figure. 2 The Declaratory 
doctrine 
The Constitutive doctrine 
Meta-theoretical 
framework 
The natural law theory Legal positivism 
International law Obligatory character 
apart from the wills of 
individual States 
Derived from the maxim of 
‘pacta sunt servanda’: A 
‘common pact’ between 
States. 
State recognition A declaratory act: States 
exists from the moment 
they satisfy certain 
objective tests  
A constitutive act: States 
exists as legal persons only 
in relation to one another   
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Figure 2. illustrates the doctrines' diverging perspectives on state recognition, as well 
as their definition of international law as it derives from their different meta-
theoretical framework. Further, we shall introduce Mervyn Frost’s attempt to update 
the constitutive doctrine to a post-Cold War era, through a critique of the declarative 
doctrine and an attempt to merge the legal act of state recognition with the spreading 
of normative values. 
 
4.3 Theories on International Relation 
In the following chapter, we will briefly account for the neo-realist and neo-liberalist 
perception of the dynamics of the international society and how the actors perform 
within arena in order for us to introduce the common dichotomies and issues that are 
present when engaged with international relations. The theories will be presented 
continuously of one another, as concepts and ideas are often better explained when 
put in relation to its antagonist, thus elucidating those features that the theory has 
derived as a critique of. In international politics, realism and liberalism are often 
referred to as the most influential lines of thought that has been developed through 
centuries and fostered new branches of theories throughout the years, while the 
increasing globalization has further increased the speed of development of new 
theories in an attempt to explain the dynamics between organizations and states in 
the international society.  The two traditional theories within IR have been assigned 
the term neo and have started approaching each other in their descriptions on power 
relations between states and their description on the execution of power.  
Nevertheless, despite the similarities that can be found between neo-liberalism and 
neo-realism in between, we have chosen to stratify the differences. 
 
4.4 Neorealism  
Through this project the concept of soft power is part of a greater theoretical frame in 
the field of international relations that will be explained through neo-liberalism. The 
concept of soft power was not explicitly developed until 1990 by Joseph Nye (Nye, 
1990). The notion of soft power is a concept employed by both neo-realist and neo-
liberal theories, in the sense that the concept was negatively invented by the realists, 
who made a distinction between hard and other forms of power, where hard power is 
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defined as anything that can be turned into military strength. 
 
The notion of power as an instrument in international politics was defined by 
Morgenthau to explain how the second world war started, and how to prevent it from 
happening again by understanding the nature of international relations (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2007: 67). Morgenthau explained the international system as composed by 
self interested, power seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security 
and chances of survival. Any cooperation between states is explained as functional in 
order to maximize each individual state's security (Ibid: 60). The concept of power is 
defined by Morgenthau as consisting of the two components soft and hard power, 
where hard power is defined as anything that can be turned into military strength 
being production, economy and men at arms, while soft power is influence that is not 
directly linked to military strength, such as culture and religious values (Ibid: 67). 
 
4.5 Liberal paradigm 
Neo-liberal institutionalism, lead by Robert Keohane, emerged as a response to neo-
realism (ibid: 117). One of the aims of the neo-liberal institutionalists was to 
concretise the liberal paradigm, which involved a clarification of important concepts 
such as institutions. Although neo-liberal institutionalists accept the realist perception 
of states as primary actors in a fundamental anarchic international system, they argue 
that state behaviour is modified by interaction with international institutions, and that 
international institutions reduce the possibility of international conflict (Ibid: 108). 
Keohane argues that patterns of cooperation and discord can only be understood in 
the context of institutions, which define the meaning and importance of state actions. 
 
The neo-liberal school also has another set of ideas concerning the agenda of the 
nation state. Where the neo-realist theory emphasizes power maximization, the neo-
liberal school explains the interests of a state as something that is institutionalized 
through interaction with other states. Thus, with institutionalization as an important 
facet of world order, states' interest are more cooperative than conflicting, which 
implies that states are concerned with absolute gains, hence beneficial for all states 
involved (Jackson & Sørensen,2007:118). As cooperative power implies a 
renunciation of military power, then power should also be understood as something 
that persuade other actors to develop the same interests as oneself through other 
power mechanisms. The next part will introduce the concept of soft power as 
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described in neo-liberal theory. 
 
4.6 Soft power 
Through this project we argue that the EU’s conditionalities for recognition of the 
Kosovarian state, is to be regarded as an expression of an underlying security 
strategy relying on soft power. The concept of soft power, which is also referred to as 
'co-optive power', was redeveloped by Joseph Nye in the book ‘Bound to Lead’ from 
1990 and relies on the ability to affect others to want the same outcomes as oneself 
through attraction and incentives rather than by coercion or by payment.   
 
“The basic concept of power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you 
want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten coercion (sticks); the 
second is to pay (carrots); the third is to attract them or co-opt them, so that they 
want what you want. If you can get others to be attracted to want what ou want, (to 
help set their preferences),it costs you much less in carrots and sticks” (Nye 2008:94)  
 
While the stick and the carrot are to be regarded as military and economic power 
respectively, soft power is to be understood as a combination of culture, political 
values and foreign policies. In order to impose values and policies on another state, it 
must seem attractive for the other state to adopt them. Hard and soft power is 
therefore related, because a goal is ultimately attained by affecting the behavior of 
other states. Behavior between commanding and cooperative, can be seen on a 
spectrum ranging from coercion to economic inducement to agenda-setting and 
finally to pure attraction of ideas. Where hard power is connected to a commanding 
behavior, soft power tools tends to be related to the co-optive end of the spectrum 
(Nye: 2004).  
  
Thus, an EU articulation of a right intention is of utter importance for its policies to 
be seen as legitimate and as having moral authority. If a state can make its power and 
strategy seem legitimate, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. (Nye, 
2008:95) Therefore a country or a cooperative institution such as the EU can obtain 
its goals by inspiring other countries to follow its example with the prospect of 
aspiring to its levels of prosperity and openness, emphasizing the absolute gains for 
the actors involved. As such, there is a manipulation of the interdependence between 
states. While interdependence can also mean a harmonically relationship between 
entities, in power politics it often refers to an unevenly balanced mutual dependence 
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where the very aim of the power game is to create and resist these linkages when a 
state is either less or more vulnerable than the other. 
In other words, soft power is closely related to the liberal belief that actors may share 
common interests and can engage in collaborative and cooperative social action with 
the final result of greater benefits for everybody, also known as the concept of 
absolute gains. 
 
4.7 State recognition as an instrument of soft power 
In his book, “Ethics in International Relations - a Constitutive Theory”, Mervyn 
Frost renews his critique of the declarative doctrine of statehood, and argues that it is 
not responsive to the need for instituting normative values in international law and 
World politics. Frost draws strong references to Hegel, and his theory basically 
revolves around Hegel’s famous quote  
 
“A State should receive it’s full and final legitimation through it’s recognition by 
other States […] although this recognition needs to be safeguarded by the proviso 
that were a state is recognized by others, it should also recognize them, i.e. respect 
their autonomy; and so it comes about that they cannot be indifferent to each other’s 
domestic affairs” (Frost, 1996:152)    
 
From Hegel’s essential point, that states cannot be indifferent to each others domestic 
policies. Frost derives his theory: a constitutive theory based upon normative values, 
in which he in his own words “attempt to introduce ethics to World Politics in the 
post-Cold War era” (Frost, 1996:5). As a natural response to these claims, 
declaratory theorists have criticized Frost arguing that not only is he and Hegel 
wrong in their basic assumptions of international law, but also that there is vast 
empirical evidence of this: States have hardly ever been excluded from the society of 
States because of their lacking obligation to normative values. 
Frost’s reply to this critique is interesting, as he proposes an all together new way of 
understanding the process of incorporating normative values in state recognition. He 
argues, that we must leave the notion of ‘A doorman’ who decides who is and who is 
not allowed entry to the society of states in favour of the “philosophy of a game of 
chess”. Frost illustrates his philosophy of chess with an example: a game of chess 
between two players, one experienced and one not:  
 
“If I want you to become a competent player then there is a period during which I 
have to recognize you as a competent even though I know that is not so […] while 
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you are thinking I have to observe a rule of non-interference, and afterwards I may 
point out mistakes. […] But in order for you to advance towards the kind of full 
recognition which we both seek (the kind that holds between fully competent 
players) I need to practice non-interference followed by interference” (Frost, 
1996:154) 
 
Frost’s movement from the logics of ‘gatekeeping’ towards ‘the philosophy of chess’ 
distinguishes his work from former constitutive theorists, and provides a new focus 
on the process of recognition as opposed to the criteria for recognition – whether this 
be ‘objective tests’ or ‘a common pact’. The precondition for Frost’s prescriptions is, 
that conditional recognition has been used as a soft power instrument in order to 
engage the aspiring state in the process. Accordingly, if a Frostian process of 
recognition has been initiated, a use of soft power must have been preceding the 
process. 
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5 .0 Strategy of analysis 
In the analysis of the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo, we are concerned with 
elucidating the unique features of a phenomenon, which is why our approach is 
idiographic focusing on a complete, in-depth understanding of the case. As such, we 
presuppose that the conditional recognition is an expression of an underlying 
institutional strategy.  Within our presupposition a number of variables and their 
internal relation and dynamics are to be explored. Thus, the dependent variable 1) is 
the emergence of the Kosovarian state, which is affected by the independent variable 
2) the conditionalites attached to the EU recommendation of recognition, which 
further is directed by 3) a European agenda for state recognition. Hence, we are 
operating with three variables that are depicted in Figure 3.  
 
In the analysis of the EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo, we need to establish at 
what levels we can understand the variables illustrated in Figure 3: 
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5.1 Research strategy 
The analysis of the conditional recognition can be divided into three different levels. 
Inspired by the critical realist philosophy of science we define these levels as the 
empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical domain consists of experiences and 
observations from the phenomena taking place in the actual domain, which in present 
report consists of the information drawn from the EU member countries’ recognition 
of Kosovo, the EU conditions for Kosovarian statehood and the Kosovo compliance 
to EU conditions.  The actual domain consists of the phenomena and events taking 
place as recognized at empirical level, which in present paper includes the EU 
recognition of Kosovo and the conditions-compliance dynamic per se the actors in 
between. Finally, the real domain is our hypothesis on a European agenda setting the 
precondition for recognition of Kosovo. This is not observable as opposed to the 
other two domains but constitutes those mechanisms and structures that under certain 
circumstances can cause the event that we have observed at empirical and actual 
level. 
 
Accordingly, the focal point for the analysis is to discover the processes and 
structures that lead to the EU’s recognition of Kosovo. Observable phenomena are 
thus not the central focus, but rather we are interested in the underlying mechanisms, 
structures and causalities that are the premises for the phenomenon. This further 
implies that while our ontology is empirical founded, we attain our conclusions 
through theoretical discussions. Thus, we find it appropriate to make use of the 
method of retroduction, where our observations and apparent causalities are 
identified through induction followed by a deductive formulation of hypothesis 
within the framework of the field of research. conditional deduction is, as opposed to 
deduction in its pure form, only valid to a certain degree which implies an element of 
“as if” in any causal explanation5 (Olsen & Fuglsang, 2005: 156-157). Overall the 
analysis is moving from the phenomenon that is investigated to discovering the 
underlying structures and mechanisms that are the premises for the observed act.   
 
                                                
5
    The critical realism principle of “as if”, are the tool used to make a certain condition plausible, but not 
necessarily true, by looking at what would also be true, if the tested condition where true. This logic can be used to 
study things that are not immediately available as empirical material, such as inarticulate agendas. An example of 
this is the way to find a black hole – if light cannot escape and it has high mass, then it probably is a black hole of 
gravity, although it cannot be for certain.   
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As we regard the case as unique as because of reasons briefly outlined in the problem 
field, we do not find that it is possible to generalize on the basis of these specific 
circumstances, which would have been the purpose had we wanted to investigate 
whether the conditional recognition of Kosovo can be transferred to the case of other 
secessionist movements or explore the EU’s power politics elsewhere in Europe. 
 
5.2 Data collection 
The empirical data collected, as discussed in section 2.4, has been selected by 
imposing certain criteria. The data should concern at least one of the following 
criteria: 
 
- Significant changes in Kosovo’s status 
- Important actors positioning on Kosovo’s status 
- The EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo and Kosovarian compliance   
 
The data collected in accordance with these criteria consists of reports and political 
documents, and accordingly the analysis has the character of a document analysis. 
The sources can be divided into political and juridical documents and reports 
(primary sources), and scientifically conducted research (secondary sources).   
 
Acknowledging that documents on security policies are often kept from the eyes of 
the public for years, we are aware that our access to relevant data is somewhat 
limited. Nevertheless, this is a problem often faced in the studies of contemporary 
World Politics, and as such is a condition for this paper that cannot be avoided.    
 
5.3 Primary empirical sources 
Our analysis will be directed primarily at official documents deriving from the actors 
implicated. Thus, the following key documents each signify a turning point through 
the statements articulated and therefore constitutes a cornerstone of the analysis. We 
find it important to present the following documents as they constitute both the 
foundation for the presented assumptions and hypotheses as well as being foundation 
for the empirical level of analysis.   Therefore, we will present a brief description of 
the documents and summarize the statements deduced that are found most important 
for our analysis while clarifying the context of analysis to which they are applied.   
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The documents are: 
− The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
− The Lisbon Treaty 
− The Kosovo Declaration of Independence 
− The EU Parliament Resolution P6_TA(2009)0052 
− The UN Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement 
− The EULEX Programme Strategy and Mission statement 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UN:1999) was adopted on 10 
June 1999 placing Kosovo as an autonomous province in Serbia under UN interim 
administration (UNMIK). The Resolution has been widely referred to in the period 
following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, as it reaffirms the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Serbia, thus leading to official statements categorizing both the 
unilateral declaration of independence as well as the recognition of Kosovo as illegal 
and a violation of international law.  The Resolution will be applied as a legal 
framework to clarify how EU decisions on recognition differs from previous praxis, 
while the document constitutes the turning point for the internationalization of what 
used to be the Kosovarian province. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2007) was signed by the EU Member States on 13 
December 2007 with Ireland as the only Member State that has not ratified the Treaty 
(Europa). Within the Treaty, Article 2 describes the overall values endorsed by the 
EU while Article 3 lists the goals of the EU (EU, 2007). It is the content of these two 
articles that we find expresses the political values of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty is the 
primary legislation of the EU and therefore constitutes the highest legal authority 
within the Union (EU, 2001: Article 220). The importance of the sections on values 
and goals in the Treaty is stressed by the fact that the European Court of Justice 
refers to these articles when secondary legislation is contradictory to its articles. With 
the unanimous vote in favour of the Lisbon treaty in 2007 by the respective head of 
states, the Treaty can be perceived as a document expressing the collective 
commitment for the member states to uphold the ideals that the Treaty encompasses. 
 
The Kosovo Declaration of Independence (Kosovo Assembly, 2008) was 
announced by the Assembly of Kosovo 17 February 2008. The Kosovo Declaration 
of Independence commits the Kosovo to the CSP and expresses Kosovo’s wish of 
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cooperation and integration with the European Union (Ibid). Through the Declaration 
of Independence, the Assembly of Kosovo furthermore commits to continued 
international supervision in its implementation of the CSP (Ibid). The Kosovo 
Declaration of Independence will through present project constitute the basis of 
analysis for the values incorporated into Kosovo constitution, the Kosovo 
commitment to the CSP and Kosovo’s acceptance of international supervision of its 
territory. 
 
The EU Parliament Resolution P6_TA(2009)0052 (EU, 2009) was adopted by the 
EU Parliament 5 February 2009. Through this resolution the EU Parliament 
recommends the member states that have not yet recognized Kosovo do so (Ibid: 
European Role, Article 3). The parliament furthermore stresses the prospects of a 
future EU membership for Kosovo (Ibid: Article 2), while also noting that Serbia's 
good behaviour towards the EULEX mission is a constructive attitude for Serbia's 
aspiration to join the EU (Ibid: article 8). The Parliament Resolution furthermore 
stresses Kosovo’s commitment to follow international supervision of implementation 
of the CSP (EU, 2009: article D). Through our analysis, the document will be 
referred to in connection with the European Union’s articulation of indirect 
recognition of Kosovo through conditionalities (Ibid: article F). 
 
The UN Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) S/2007/168/Add1 (UN, 2007) 
Was adopted by the UN Security Council as proposed by special UN envoy Maartti 
Ahtisaari on 26 March 2007. The CSP is also known under the name the Athisaari 
Plan and is essentially a plan for the future of Kosovo. The Athisaari Plan puts forth 
the provisions that came to mean ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo, and 
European supervision of Kosovo’s continuous compliance to the guidelines 
propounded in the plan (Ibid: article 1.11). Human right groups were further 
provided with unrestricted access to Kosovo in order to monitor the process, insuring 
that Kosovo meet the expectations of the highest international standards (Ibid, article 
2.6; 1.3). The highest international standards are in the CSP understood as inter alia 
the Universal Declaration on Human rights as well as the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Ibid, article 2.1). At 
national level, the CSP assigned Kosovo with the right to engage in international 
agreements and apply membership of international organizations (Ibid, article 1.5). 
In the context of this project the CSP therefore put forward the standards (and 
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thereby political values) that the EU has demanded fulfilled.  
The plan further confer authority for EULEX and international institutions to 
interfere in Kosovo if these standards are not met, allowing us to analyse on the 
quality of the independence of Kosovo (Ibid, article 13.1;2;3). 
 
The EULEX Programme Strategy and Mission Statement (EULEX 
2008a;2008b) are the official strategies for implementing Council Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP (EULEX, 2008b) that was decided  4 February 2008 by the Council 
of the European Union. Essentially, some of the aims of the EULEX mission are to 
help the Kosovarian institution’s adherence to “recognized” standards and European 
best practices (Ibid, Article 5 & 6) by its authority to Monitor, mentor and advise 
competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider Rule of Law (Ibid, 
article 8). The EULEX Programme Strategy will be used to identify the aim, method 
and namely the authority for the EULEX, thus accounting for the manner in which 
Kosovo is held accountable to its conditions for recognition. The EULEX’s authority 
will furthermore be elaborated on, in order to account for the actual conduction of 
European politics in Kosovo.  
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5.4 Analytical tools 
In order to make the comprehensive theories operational for an analysis of EU’s 
recommended recognition of Kosovo we find it necessary to formulate the theories 
operational to the specific context of the case. In order to do so, we have deduced the 
following analytical tools from the core concepts of the theories, starting with Joseph 
Nye’s concept of soft power: 
 
Soft power 
Soft power is co-optive power: The use of soft power implies that we are concerned 
with absolute gains and minimal costs, meaning that actor A’s exercise of soft power 
is employed in combination with actor B’s willingness to comply. 
Soft power implies interdependence: Exercise of soft power implies that actor A has 
got an interest in actor B developing interests consistent with actor A’s own.    
Soft power implies leadership: Soft power implies that power is unevenly distributed.  
Actor B wishes to follow the example of actor A, because actor A constitutes a 
positive example.   
  
In accordance with our research question, this means that we are to identify how 
actor A (EU) exercises soft power on actor B (Kosovo). If soft power is to be 
identified, conditionalities are to be implemented because of a willingness to do so 
rather than because of force. Consequently, we are to identify gains for all actors 
implied.   
 
Further, we will continue with the declaratory and constitutive doctrines of statehood 
recognition, starting with the declaratory theory  
 
 
Theories of state recognition  
Declaratory theory 
The juridical character of international law: International law has can obligatory 
character apart from the wills of individual states 
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Objective tests of ‘the marks of a state’. A state comes in to existence once certain 
objective requirements are met and not as a result of recognition by other states 
State recognition - a juridical matter: State recognition is a matter of law deriving 
from the nature of law, and not from political conviction.   
Accordingly, in relation to our research question we must identify to which extend 
the European conditional recognition is based upon objective criteria, rather than 
being an outcome of a European political strategy.    
 
Constitutive theory 
International law - agreements among states:  “International” has come into being 
through the principal of ‘pacta sunt servada’. Accordingly, international law is 
shaped by both juridical and non-juridical factors.  
State recognition - in between politics and law: Both political and juridical questions 
are at play in the act of state recognition. 
State recognition and the philosophy of chess: State recognition is a process towards full and 
mutually beneficial recognition    
Constitutive theory can thus be applied to the extend that the European Union does 
not recognize Kosovo on the basis of objective criteria as was outlined in the 
declaratory theory. Rather, recognition of Kosovo is a consequence of Kosovo 
entering the international community through fulfilling the criteria prescribed in a 
common pact, including both political and juridical elements.   
6.0 Analysis 
We shall start the analysis by investigating the content of the conditionalities 
imposed by the EU for recognition of Kosovo. Firstly, we shall investigate whether 
these conditionalities are imposed in accordance with international law as described 
in the declaratory and constitutive theories of statehood in section 4.1, in order to 
describe the relation between the conditional recognition of Kosovo and the EU’s 
commitment to international law.  
Secondly, we shall explore to which extend the conditionalities imposed can be 
perceived as instruments of soft power used by the Union to promote its own interest 
in Kosovo and the region. 
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Finally, we shall use Mervyn Frost’s constitutive theory of ethics in international 
relations (1996) to analyze how the EU’s use of conditional recognition as an 
instrument of soft power, results in a conditional recognition based upon the concept 
of the philosophy of chess. 
 
To begin with, we shall focus on the content of the conditionalities imposed and the 
claim of compliance with international law. 
  
6.1 International law and state recognition 
Decisive steps towards the foundation of the sovereign Kosovarian state were taken 
with the Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) of UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari, also known as the Ahtisaari plan. The CSP is a 61 page long and very 
thorough report presented on the 26 March 2007, containing no less than 14 articles, 
13 annexes and a total sum of 314 items regarding the future status of Kosovo. 
Though especially emphasizing the importance of human rights and minority 
protection, the CSP featured many and very different notes and considerations on a 
variety of policy areas, ranging from matters of good governance to the importance 
of free market economy (UN, 2007:2). 
The EU endorsed the plan, satisfied with the CSP’s emphasis on the necessity of 
Kosovo respecting the highest international standards of human rights and minority 
protection, including the European Convention on Human Rights.  The latest 
common European reaction to the Kosovarian declaration of independence was 
adopted at 5 February  2009, where the EU parliament issued resolution 
P6_TA(2009)0052, stating that:  
 
“Whereas on 17 February 2008 the Assembly of Kosovo declared Kosovo's 
independence and committed itself to the Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) of 
UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari[…] Encourages those EU Member States which 
have not already done so to recognise the independence of Kosovo” (EU, 2009). 
 
Thus, the EU’s encouragement of its member states to recognize the independence of 
Kosovo was dependent upon Kosovarian compliance to the conditionalities described 
in the CSP. According to the resolution, the conditional recognition of Kosovo would 
respect “[…] the European Union's commitment to complying with international law 
and to playing a leading role in ensuring the stability of Kosovo (ibid)”. As different 
connotations and understandings of state recognition exist, this statement needs 
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further investigation. Therefore, we shall first examine whether Kosovo has 'the 
marks of a state' as described in the declarative theory of statehood, especially 
focusing on the character and competence of the Kosovarian government. 
 
6.2 Who governs Kosovo? 
The conditional recognition of Kosovo is in many aspects an extraordinary case in 
international law (Noutcheva: 2006, Warbrick & McGoldrick: 2008, Coppotiers et. 
al.:2008, Almqvist: 2008).  
Historically, at least some of the objective tests described in the declaratory theory of 
statehood are normally applied when deciding on questions of statehood, and 
especially article 1 from the Montevideo Convention has gained special status 
(Caplan, 2005:182). We shall therefore investigate whether Kosovo has ‘the marks of 
a state’ as prescribed in the Montevideo Convention, and whether or not this has 
been a consideration in the EU’s conditional recognition.   
 
The CSP defines Kosovo as a territorial entity with a permanent population and 
specific cultural heritage (UN, 2007: annex 9, article 3, 3.2). Accordingly, 
qualifications (a) and (b) in the Montevideo Convention are obtained, and several 
references to the Kosovarian people and territory exists in resolution 
P6_TA(2009)0052 (EU, 2009). There are, however, good reasons to question 
whether a government capable of governing the territory (qualification (c)) and 
entering relations with other states (qualification (d)) exists at all. It is stated in the 
CSP’s article 13.1 and 13.2 that the European Union shall establish a European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Kosovo, working in the field of rule of law 
that: 
 
“[…] shall assist Kosovo authorities […] ensuring that these institutions are free 
from political interference and in accordance with internationally recognized 
standards and European best practices […] and shall provide mentoring, monitoring 
and advice in the area of the rule of law generally, while retaining certain powers, in 
particular, with respect to the judiciary, police, customs and correctional services, 
under modalities and for a duration tobe determined by the Council of the European 
Union”(UN, 2007:8) 
 
The ESDP’s (more specifically EULEX; the mission that was employed in Kosovo) 
authority to “retaining certain powers” with respect to some of the key areas of the 
sovereign state, is thus questioning the Kosovarian government’s ability to govern its 
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own territory as defined in qualifications (c) in the Montevideo Convention, and 
conflicts with specifications made in article 3 in the Montevideo Convention, which 
states that: 
 
“[A sovereign State has the right] consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to 
legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and 
competence of its courts” (Taiwan Document Process: Montevideo Convention) 
 
Further, the Kosovarian government’s ability to enter into international relations 
pursuing its own will and strategic goals are questioned in annex IX, article 1 in the 
CSP. The article addresses the matter of Serbia’s external debts, and states that 
 
“Kosovo shall assume its share of the external debt of the Republic of' Serbia. 
Kosovo's share shall be determined through negotiations between Kosovo and the 
Republic of Serbia” (UN, 2007:47) 
 
The article obligates Kosovo to assume its share of the external debt, and binds 
Kosovo to negotiations with Serbia on the matter. Detailed descriptions on the terms 
of negotiation exist in annex IX (UN, 2007:48).  Based upon the content in article 13 
and annex IX article 1 in the CSP, it is reasonable to conclude that the Kosovarian 
government is not capable of governing Kosovo and entering international relations 
based upon its own will, and more importantly: according to the CSP it has no 
ultimate right to do so.   
With the CSP’s circumvention of these focal points in the Montevideo convention, 
even the most central arguments in the declaratory theory of statehood, have been 
ignored by the EU in its conditional recognition of Kosovo. While the EU insists on 
its commitment to international law, we must therefore look for other explanations to 
the legality of the conditional recognition. Hence, we will apply the constitutive 
theory of statehood to analyze this commitment further.     
 
6.3 The highest international standards 
In explaining the relation between the EU’s commitment to international law and the 
comprehensive set of conditionalities imposed for recognizing Kosovo, the EU 
simply points to the CSP as a legal source itself: 
 
“Whereas the CSP is enshrined in the Kosovo Constitution and other laws […][the 
European Parliament] encourages those EU Member States which have not already 
 36 
done so to recognise the independence of Kosovo” (EU, 2009) 
 
As the CSP itself is not a recognized legal source for determining questions of state 
recognition, the EU must be of the understanding that the legality of the conditional 
recognition stems from the CSP’s goals of implementing the highest international 
standards and norms in Kosovo. In referring to international standards and norms 
while ignoring the fundamental article 1 in the Montevideo Convention, the EU 
explicitly commits itself to an international law based solely upon the concept of 
'pacta sunt servanda' – the common pact.  Not only does the EU refer to a common 
pact of international norms and standards, but to a common pact based upon the 
highest international standards of governance, especially regarding human rights and 
minority protection 
 
“Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society […] The exercise of public authority in 
Kosovo shall be based upon the equality of all citizens and respect for the highest 
level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well 
as the promotion and protection of the rights and contributions of all its Communities 
and their members” (UN, 2007:2) 
 
Seen in the light of the Balkan history of ethnic conflict and genocide,  it seems only 
natural that the UN and the EU subject Kosovo to the highest standards of human 
rights protection. Furthermore, it is a valid argument within the constitutive theory of 
state recognition, that human rights and minority protection has reached the level of 
internationally recognized norms and standards confined in a common pact. 
However, when studying the content of all the 314 items in the CSP in details, it 
becomes evident that many policy areas and values of different character are implied. 
The EU defines the ‘international norms and standards’ to which these various 
policies and values are subjected, as  
 
“[Internatonal standards is] a general term that seeks to capture those norms and laws 
introduced by international organizations (e.g. the United Nations, European Union) 
that recognize and promote fundamental rights and freedoms […]Relevant in this 
regard for the Kosovo […] is the compliance with the European Union “acquis 
communautaire””(EULEX, 2008a: quotation in original)  
 
The EU emphasize that it is of special relevance that Kosovo acts in compliance with 
the standards and norms presented in the EU’s ‘acquis communautaire’, which is the 
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Unions own term for the total body of EU law accumulated thus far6. By 
conditioning recognition with compliance to regional norms and standards, as 
opposed to commonly agreed standards and norms in the international society as a 
whole, the EU brings forth a new eurocentric interpretation of 'pacta sunt servanda': 
It is no longer only the common consensus (Chen 1951:25) that brings legality to the 
pact, but the quality of the agreed norms and standards in it.  
 
6.4 Summary 
From the perspectives offered by the declaratory doctrine, the EU’s conditional 
recognition of Kosovo cannot be seen as an act in accordance with international law. 
Firstly, because declaratory theorists claim that conditional recognition is per se an 
illegal act (Chen, 1951, Grant, 1999). Secondly, and even more important, the EU’s 
conditional recognition completely disregards the ‘marks of the state’ defined in the 
Montevideo Conventions article 1, and thereby ignores the objective tests of 
statehood that represent the core of the declaratory doctrine.  
 
Ignoring the Montevideo Convention and by large the declaratory doctrine, the EU 
instead intertwined the legal question of recognition to Kosovo’s compliance with 
the CSP. As the CSP states that Kosovo should be subject to ‘international norms and 
standards’, the legality of applying the CSP as a set of conditionalities for 
recognition, is derived from the Hegelian concept of 'pacta sunt servanda' explained 
in our theoretical framework. The 'pacta sunt servanda' has, however, a somewhat 
altered meaning in this context. While legal positivists have argued that ‘the common 
pact’ obtain legal status when a consensus is established around certain norms and 
standards, the EU seems to be of the belief that the legal status of norms and 
standards can be established as a consequence of the quality of the standards. It is 
with reference to the spreading of these highest international norms and standards, 
or what we can term a European pacta sunt servanda, that the EU recommends its 
member states to recognize Kosovo, while still maintaining that this is in compliance 
with international law.     
 
                                                
6   The phrase 'acquis communautaire', sometimes translated as 'the Community patrimony' denotes the whole 
range of principles, policies, laws, practices, obligations and objectives that have been agreed or that have developed 
within the European Union. The acquis communautaire includes most notably the Treaties in their entirety, all the 
legislation enacted to date and the judgements of the Court of Justice.  
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6.5 Conditional recognition, soft power and strategic interests 
In this part of the analysis we shall investigate to which extend the imposed 
conditionalities can be perceived as an exercise of soft power on behalf of the EU. 
The approach is to analyse how the EU’s emphasis on Kosovarian incorporation of 
European values and policies has allowed the Union not only to have supervisory 
role, but also a role that stands beyond that of national authorities, as can be read 
from Kosovo declaration of independence article 5: 
  
“We welcome the international community's continued support of our democratic 
development through international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of 
UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). We invite and welcome an international 
civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a 
European Union-led rule of law mission.” (Kosovo Assembly: 2008) 
 
The article contains elements of the concepts of conditions and compliance. As 
outlined in section 4.6, Joseph Nye divides the way in which coercive power can take 
its form into three categories; military power, economic power and soft power, or 
rather, as Nye referred to them himself; the stick, the carrot and soft power. 
Accordingly these tools are the different ways in which one state can influence 
another state on its actions.   
 
Further, we shall discuss how the EU’s support for Kosovarian independence has 
taken its form, through an empirical analysis concurrent with a theoretical discussion 
of conditions and compliance as understood through a strategy of soft power. The 
analysis will demonstrate the dynamics between the European values trickling down 
to the EU’s periphery and the Kosovarian implementation and adjustment to a 
European agenda.   
 
6.6 European indirect recognition  
When Martti Ahtisaari in February 2007 concluded that ‘supervised independence’ 
for Kosovo was the only viable solution, he suggested that: 
 
 “… I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is 
independence to be supervised for an initial period by the international community 
[…] I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would […] 
come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the 
Settlement proposal” (UN: 2007) 
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The planning for supervised independence was initiated shortly after Ahtisaari’s 
statement. The EU was through a new body; the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) organized to take over the administration from 
UNMIK. Encouraged by indications that support was to be found among the US and 
important EU member states, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 
2008 emphasising its commitment to the international community and declaring its 
independence to be bound with compliance to the Ahtisaari plan as can be read from 
the article below:  
 
“We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally 
bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including 
especially the obligations for it under the Ahtisaari Plan. In all of these matters, we 
shall act consistently with the principles of international law and resolutions of the 
Security Council, including resolution 1244. We declare publicly that all States are 
entitled to rely upon this Declaration, and appeal to them to extend us their support 
and friendship”  (Kosovo Assembly: 2008) 
 
Kosovo has a history with presence of western international law enforcement 
organizations in the region, and the wide presence of NATO and EU has nowhere 
been represented to such a wide extend as here7 (Udenrigsministeriet). Where other 
secessionist claims first and foremost are a matter of domestic law, the autonomy of 
Kosovo was internationalized in 1999 by UN resolution 1244, that changed the status 
of Kosovo administration from Serbian rule to be governed by the international 
community (UN: 1999). 
Accordingly, European institutions and EU member states have exerted great 
influence in Kosovo, where laws and institutions are set up and run under UN 
supervision, in praksis by the EU (UN 1999: article 17). This means, that Kosovo 
since 1999 has had the character of a semi-protectorate governed by European 
officials under the auspices of the United Nations (Zielonka,  2006:476-478). The 
role of EULEX appears from the excerpt of the EULEX mission statement below:  
 
“EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and 
in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system 
and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free 
from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and 
European best practices.” (EULEX, 2008b) 
 
                                                
7 EULEX is the largest EU mission outside Brussels with approx. 2000 staff members.   
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As can be read from above, the EU plays a paradoxical role: in one sense restraining 
and in another enhancing Kosovarian independence at the same time. Through 
empowerment of Kosovo, the EU has had its influence on implementing policies 
through promotion of procedures, policies and rules thus conducting a soft power 
strategy.  
 
Though deeply involved in this process, which eventually resulted in the Kosovarian 
declaration of independence, the EU had no executive legal power to recognize 
Kosovo as an independent state, as the institution is not eligible for entering binding 
diplomatic relations on behalf of its member states 
Thus, the EU explicitly stated as per 18 February 2008, that the decision on 
recognition falls to the respective member states (EU: 2008). The presence of 
EULEX in Kosovo is supported by all member states except Spain (EU 
oplysningen), makes us distinguish between the concepts of direct recognition and 
indirect recognition. Where a direct recognition can only be granted through its 
member states, we regard an indirect recognition as a process of Europeanisation; an 
attempt to make Kosovo as a unit adapt to the European Union. Interestingly, many 
of those features that Kosovo institutions are to adapt through EULEX supervision 
are similar to those criteria set for countries to be considered eligible for accession to 
the EU. Most notably is Kosovo’s obligation to incorporate the Copenhagen criteria, 
including a wide range of political and economic standards, that are the explicit 
requirement for membership, of the Union (European Commission). 
Thus we conclude that the purpose of the presence of external actors in the 
Kosovarian domestic institutions and authorities is to affect the way in which the 
Kosovarian authorities shape their interests in agreement with the external actors, 
through a strategic use of soft power. This leads us to the next section where we will 
outline the Kosovarian implementation of European standards in its declaration of 
independence, which we will argue, can be understood as an outcome of the 
Kosovarian politically constrained space.  
 
6.7 European conditions and Kosovarian Compliance  
The spreading of European norms and values through institutions is encompassed in 
the concept of Europeanisation, which refers to a process where EU dynamics are 
integrated in domestic and national politics.  
An early definition of Europeanisation was developed by Robert Ladrech in 1994 
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that defines the concept as ‘an incremental process of re-orienting the direction and 
shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic dynamics become part 
of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.’ (Ladrech 
1994:69) In the following section, we will consider the concept of Europeanisation as 
a process where the Kosovarian state is considered receptive with changes  deriving 
from the influence of the European Union. Consequently, Kosovo is complying with  
the European conditionalities and is directing its policies so that the EU policies 
becomes crucially integrated into the Kosovarian domestic policy framework.  
 
Neo-liberal institutionalism considers the European Union as an expression of shared 
norms and values, regional integration and peace nation-states in between (Jackson 
& Sørensen 2007:42-45, 108-110), as written in the ‘Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union’ of 9 May 2008, article 2: 
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States 
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.(EU:2008) 
 
Furthermore Article 3 (1) determines that “The Union's aim is to promote peace, its 
values and the well-being of its peoples”(Ibid). These articles determine that the EU 
has both a liberal set of values as well as a desire to exercise and promote these 
values, which we will argue relates closely to the conditional recognition of Kosovo.  
 
In the Kosovo declaration of independence, the Kosovo nation recognizes that they 
have to converge towards the European norms for good governance, and explicitly 
state that their future lies with Europe.  
 
“For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the 
European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to 
facilitate full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement 
the reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integration” (Kosovo Assembly. 
2008: Article 6) 
 
Article 6 in the Kosovarian declaration of independence, thus reflects two issues of 
importance of the Kosovarian articulated motion towards European standards. First 
are the reasons of culture, geography and history as presented in the first part of the 
article. This reflects a norm-based process of socialization explicitly stating that 
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Kosovo belongs with its ‘European family’ and thus indicates a logic of 
appropriateness, or what can be understood as a compliance to soft power. The 
second part of the article deals with an interest-based compliance, as Kosovo wishes 
to take “all steps necessary” to attain membership in the EU. Thus, Kosovarian 
compliance is also motivated by the material and economic incentives – incentives 
the EU did not fail to promote - and therefore reflects a logic of interest, or a 
compliance to Nye’s carrot incentive. Compliance to the European conditionalities 
can thus be understood as being imposed conditionalities or as a process of 
socialization, where in the case of Kosovo, both are complementing each other.8 
 
The EU usually employs conditionality in connection to membership and 
enlargement of the union, where prospective member states must meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria define whether a country is eligible 
for membership, including among other things obligations on governance of human 
rights and institutions for preserving democratic governance as was last seen during 
the Eastern enlargement of the Union (EU-oplysningen: 2007). The Union, however, 
did not fail to articulate a prospective membership for Kosovo, not as a candidate 
country as such, but as what the European Commission terms a ‘potential candidate’, 
whatever that means (European Commission). This again, points back to the use of 
soft power and the indirect recognition from the European Union; because how else 
can a state under UN supervision be considered a potential member of the European 
Union? As the EULEX mission’s goal is to implement standards in Kosovo 
corresponding to the content of the Copenhagen Criteria, while also Kosovo state 
that it wishes to take “all steps necessary” to enter the Union, the pattern is 
consistent. We therefore find that Kosovarian compliance to the conditions imposed 
by the EU is not only related to the question of state recognition, but also closely 
linked to culture and the potential membership of the European Union. In fact, 
Kosovarian compliance to the CSP not only consolidates good relations to the EU, 
but also imposes standards important to other international actors such as the USA, 
NATO and the IMF who recently granted Kosovo yet another indirect recognition 
through their accession9. While this, on one hand, can be argued to increase the 
incentives for Kosovarian incorporation of the standards, it also supports the EU’s 
                                                
8  The concepts ”logic of appropriateness” and ”logic of interest” derives from Noutcheva, 2006: 8-10.  
9               The International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered the Republic of Kosovo to become the                   
186th member of the IMF at a session on May 5th 2009 (www.IMF.org) 
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statement of the principles being of international standard.  The incentives the EU 
have presented Kosovo, has therefore had significant influence on Kosovarian 
behavior, as a European soft power strategy has been combined with an element of 
economic incentives.  
 
Matters of compliance and conditionalities, whatever form it takes, relies upon 
fundamental asymmetries in the global arena, made quite visible in the relations 
between the EU and Kosovo. The conditionalities imposed indicate someone inferior 
attempting to approach the major powers, hence allowing the superior to insist on 
adoption of standards that do not necessarily have universal currency (Caplan, 
2005:8). Further we shall investigate how, despite the asymmetries, both Kosovo and 
the EU apparently benefits from the situation, by applying the neo-liberal concept of 
absolute gains. (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 119)  
While the neo-realist approach to gains is centered around national interests that 
increases security and survival through relative power gains, the neo-liberal concept 
of absolute gains is the idea, that states can cooperate and obtain mutual benefits is 
possible. The concept is based upon the assumption that not all national interests are 
subject to the logics of competition, and cooperation can therefore be an asset for all 
actors involved, national and international, when promoted.  
If considering the spreading of values and goals  by the EU as the institution's main 
objective by its recognition of Kosovo, (EU, 2009) and the recognition and 
prosperous development of Kosovo as the Kosovarian goal, it is possible to approach 
the EU’s conditional recognition as a case involving absolute gains for both sides.  
 
6.8 Implementing the CSP and ‘the philosophy of chess’ 
Mervyn Frost’s constitutive theory of ethics in international relations prescribes how 
soft power strategies and conditional recognition can initiate a process that gives rise 
to certain normative values (Frost 1996). Thus, the question of how the EU has 
sought to ensure Kosovarian implementation of the conditionalities attached to 
recognition helps us answer whether the EU’s conditional recognition can be 
perceived as a soft power strategy with references to a constitutive legal source. In 
order to answer this question, we need to clarify the EU’s strategy for ensuring 
implementation of the imposed conditionalities, and further compare this approach to 
Frost’s notion of the philosophy of chess. 
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The EU strategy for ensuring Kosovarian implementation of the CSP is described in 
the EULEX programmatic approach paper: 
 
“[the] EULEX will assist Kosovo authorities, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in their progress toward sustainability and accountability […] 
The mission (…) will implement its mandate through monitoring, mentoring, and 
advising, while retaining certain executive functions” (EULEX, 2008b) 
 
From the perspectives of Frost and the concept of ‘the philosophy of chess’, the EU’s 
focus on monitoring, mentoring and advising is interesting. The focus on the process 
of developing good governance in accordance with best European practices is similar 
to the procedural approach prescribed by Frost, where phases of non-interference are 
followed by interference in the process of learning to participate in a given practice. 
In order to test whether or not the EU’s approach is in fact in accordance with Frost’s 
philosophy of chess, we need to understand what exactly are the intentions behind 
the EU’s strategy of monitoring, mentoring and advising. The EULEX programmatic 
approach describes advising and monitoring as: 
 
“Advise is perhaps the most obvious function […] to provide expert information to 
their Kosovo counterparts, in pursuit of the aims described above: European best 
practice, internationally recognized standards, multi-ethnicity, sustainability and 
accountability” (EULEX, 2008a:4) 
 
Continuing: 
 
“Monitor is a word that suggests ‘watching’, ‘observing’, ‘checking’, ‘assessing’ 
and ‘evaluating’ and implies a system of measuring performance […] The 
monitoring role means also accurately recording what is observed and reporting, in 
order to identify possible improvements” (ibid.) 
 
The definitions of advising and monitoring shown above can reasonably be claimed 
to be instruments of respectively the non-interference and interference phase: a phase 
of observing in order to identify possible improvements is followed by a phase of 
advising, in order to improve the negative behavior of the person playing the 
game/state developing practices. Thus, the strategy of the EU acknowledges that 
Kosovarian compliance to the conditions described in the CSP is not achieved per se, 
but through a long lasting process of observing and advising. This process is, 
however, only possible if a complicated relationship of mutual trust is established. In 
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establishing this relationship, the EU’s definition of mentoring is crucial        
 
“Mentor in the context of the EULEX mission describes the manner in which 
EULEX staff will advise and monitor […] based on mutual trust and professional 
respect: to assist in the development of new skills and knowledge by coaching or 
showing how a task could be carried out; to encourage counterpart staff to take action 
and discuss the consequences of decisions and actions” (Ibid) 
 
The EU’s emphasis on mutual trust and professional respect is the precondition for 
establishing the process that Frost prescribes: if the strategy is truly to alter 
Kosovarian behavior, it is an absolute necessity that the EU treats the Kosovarian 
institutions as capable of conducting competent governance, even though they know 
this might not be the case. By recognizing Kosovo as a competent state throughout 
the process, the EU’s recognition of Kosovo is not a “once-off” gate-keeping act in 
which they allow Kosovo in, or turn them away from the society of States. Instead, it 
is recognition of Kosovo as a state who can implement the norms and standards 
defined in the CSP while indicating the EU’s willingness to assist Kosovo and a 
commitment to provide counseling in a number of ways. Accordingly, the EU’s 
strategy for implementation points to Frost’s notion of ‘the philosophy of chess’, and 
thereby underpin the research results so far: the EU has pursued a strategy of soft 
power in its conditional recognition of Kosovo to spread its values in accordance 
with its declared objectives.  
 
 
 
6.9 Summary 
As concluded earlier, the EULEX mission goals and the CSP represents values and 
governance standards of the EU, explicitly stating that the task for the Kosovarian 
institutions is to be in compliance with the EU’s ‘acquis communautaire’ (EULEX, 
2008a). Therefore, we have come to the conclusion, that the EU’s conditional 
recognition of Kosovo contains a variety of incentives for Kosovo to adapt European 
norms, standards and values. Thus, we regard the condition-compliance dynamics 
reflected in the implementation of European values as part of a comprehensive co-
optive power strategy, combined with an economic incentive, thus using power 
instruments Nye would classify as ‘instruments of soft power’ and the 'carrot'.  
Kosovarian compliance to the conditionalities is motivated by the many incentives 
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promoted by the EU, along with a wish to connect with Western Europe in the future. 
This objective, alongside the EU’s goal of spreading European values, make possible 
a situation where absolute gains are obtainable, which explains the dynamics and 
enthusiasm from both parties in regards to the conditional recognition.  
The strategy of implementing the CSP marks the beginning of a long lasting process 
towards the implementation of the standards and norms contained in the plan. This 
process of spreading standards and norms, European values and standards, reflects 
the prescriptions in Frost’s constitutive theory of ethics in international relations, and 
make it possible to address what Frost calls ‘the pressing need for introducing ethics 
in international relations’ (Frost, 1996:5). This supports the thesis of this paper, that 
the EU has pursued a strategy of soft power by its conditional recognition of Kosovo.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
The EU exercised soft power when conditioning the recognition of Kosovo to its 
compliance to the CSP, in reality obligating Kosovo to complying with the European 
‘acquis communautaire’. All though the EU has not explicitly named the legal source 
by which it legitimizes the conditional recognition, its emphasis on international 
norms and standards indicates a commitment to international law deriving from the 
concept of ‘pacta sunt servanda’. The application of the EU’s own norms and 
standards as the legal source represents, however, a euro-centric interpretation of the 
‘pacta sunt servanda’ as the legality is claimed to stem from the quality of the norms 
and standards rather than the consensus established around them. Thus, the EU refers 
to the compliance with its own norms and standards as the legal source justifying the 
conditional recognition of Kosovo.  
 
The EU has been successful in pursuing its strategy, as the conditions imposed by the 
Union are in consistency with Kosovo’s own wishes. Kosovarian compliance can be 
explained by the incentives promoted by the EU: 1) Kosovo’s socialization towards 
European standards, 2) Kosovo’s wish to be recognized as a state and 3) Kosovo’s 
desire to obtain EU membership.  Thus, the EU has combined the exercise of soft 
power with the economic incentive of a possible membership, resulting in a situation 
where the parties obtain absolute gains from their cooperation. The process of 
implementing the imposed conditionalities from the CSP supports the conclusions 
made so far: Through advising, monitoring and mentoring, the EU’s strategy for 
implementing the CSP is similar to Frost’s strategy for combining soft power and 
state recognition in a ‘philosophy of chess’, with the explicit goal of spreading 
certain normative values.  
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8.0 Quality evaluation 
We shall evaluate the quality of the research conducted in this paper by discussing 
the validity and reliability of the analysis. This includes a discussion of the 
theoretical framework, collection of data and the limitations to the results presented. 
Reaffirming that the goal of this paper has been to shed light to the EU’s conditional 
recognition of Kosovo, the perspectives provided on the practice of state recognition 
in this paper cannot be subjected to generalization.    
 
8.1 Validity 
As outlined in section 5.2, we have collected the empirical data employed in the 
analysis by applying certain criteria for selecting relevant sources. The official 
documents that constitute the majority of the empirical data employed are sufficient 
for introducing the major actors and events leading to the conditional recognition. It 
is, however, a cursory introduction, as we examine strategies and agendas that might 
very well be kept from the eyes of the public. Though we have not obtained data that 
could provide deeper insights on these strategies and agendas, e.g. by interviewing 
relevant politicians or academics, we believe that the data applied is relevant in the 
attempt to answer the research question. Further, we believe that the official 
statements made by the EU, Kosovo and the UN actually reflect the strategies 
pursued by the actors. The coherences between the statements supports this belief, 
and we therefore find it reasonable to question whether another conclusion would 
have been attained, had other criteria been applied and other sets of data been 
explored.  
 
The theories presented have been selected with the explicit goal of constructing a 
framework capable of combining perspectives of international law and the neo-
liberal school of international relations. We believe that this specific goal has been 
attained; by introducing the antagonist perspectives of the declarative and 
constitutive doctrines it has been illustrated, that depending upon ones research 
position, the conditional recognition of Kosovo can be perceived as either a violation 
of or in adherence to international law. Depending upon this position, it is further 
possible to condition state recognition to normative criteria as opposed to the 
objective criteria prescribed in the declaratory doctrine. Reflections on the limitations 
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to this design are however necessary.  
The theoretical basis from which we have investigated the conditional recognition 
only allow us to understand the empirical data as expressions of certain perceptions 
of law and/or certain neo-liberal strategies of pursuing interests. Macro political 
reflections and questions of the balance of power, including the relationship between 
the EU and Russia in the post-Cold War, are not possible to include in this paper, as 
the theoretical framework does not offer sufficient analytical instruments to analyze 
these events. Our commitment to theories of international law has especially 
restrained our possibility of including these perspectives, as they could effectively 
undermine the very purpose of including these theories by arguing, that international 
law is nothing more than a reflection of the international balance of power.     
This being said, we believe that once accepting the premises of the neo-liberal 
doctrine, the results presented are valid within the theoretical framework employed, 
while acknowledging that other perspectives could contribute with meaningful 
perspectives to the case. 
 
In conclusion, we find that the selected empirical data and theoretical framework 
constitutes the elements necessary to answer the research question, although 
acknowledging that other research strategies could generate other meaningful 
conclusions.  
8.2 Reliability 
The reliability of the conclusion is dependent upon the degree of a logic sound 
argumentation behind the results presented. The reliability presents itself when the 
argumentation is supported by the empirical truth, and that a reverse of the 
argumentation cannot be supported. 
In the following section, we will enumerate the logic reasoning behind the 
conclusions attained.   
 
We have argued that EU’s has exercised soft power through its conditional 
recognition. The argumentation behind the statement is that:  
1a: Soft power is voluntary conformity to the political values of another actor 
1b: The EU has set Kosovo incorporation of political values and standards as 
conditional to recognition, and; 
1c: Kosovo has voluntarily incorporated the political values and standards of the EU, 
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thus; 
1d:  the conditional recognition of Kosovo is soft power. 
 
The second part of the conclusion is that the act of using normative conditionalities 
subscribe to a constitutive conception of state recognition. The argumentation is: 
 
2a: Constitutive theory constitutes the concept of state recognition as a common pact. 
2b: The EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo is justified with reference to 
Kosovo’s compliance to international norms and standards, thus;  
2c: The EU conception of state recognition subscribe to a constitutive conception of 
law. 
 
In the third part of the conclusion it is stated that it is mutually beneficial for both the 
EU and Kosovo to collaborate and create a Kosovarian state that complies with 
European norms and standards. The argumentation is: 
 
3a: It is beneficial for the EU to condition recognition of Kosovo to compliance with 
European norms and standards. 
3b: It is the wish of Kosovo to become a state. 
3c: If Kosovo comply with European standards it will be recognized as a state, thus; 
3d: Conditional recognition is beneficial for both Kosovo and the EU 
 
The fourth and last part of the conclusion it is stated that Kosovo’s reason to 
incorporate the EU values and standards is both from a logic of appropriateness and 
from a logic of interests. The argumentation is: 
 
4a: It is appropriate for states with a euro-centric culture, history and geography to 
join the EU. 
4b: The self understanding of Kosovo is that it has a euro centric culture, history and 
geography. 
4c: Economic gains and international recognition are state interests. 
4d: EU membership can be seen as an economic advantage as well as recognition of 
Kosovo, thus; 
4e: It follows that Kosovo wishes to join the EU from both a logic of appropriateness 
and from a logic of interests. 
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These four chains of argumentation are logically sound, when accepting the premises 
of neo-liberal institutionalism. New collections of data alike should therefore derive at 
the same result under similar circumstances. Thus, when the premises of a neo-liberal 
perspective are accepted as the pre-condition for the research conducted, we regard 
the conclusions as valid and reliable.  
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9.0 Perspectives   
On November 29th 1991 the Badinter Arbitration Committee10, an European ad hoc  
created organ required to provide legal advice on the issues surrounding the civil war 
in Yugoslavia, stated that “The socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia is in the 
process of dissolution” (Caplan, 2005:22). When Croatia and Slovenia later declared 
their independence in February 1991, the European Community was inescapably 
implicated in the Yugoslav conflict, as its decisions concerning recognition or non-
recognition of the emerging Balkan states would come to have great effect on the 
events taking place in the region.  
The EU’s conditional recognition of Kosovo can be seen as the final step towards 
ending the process of disintegration that was started in 1991. By recognizing the 
independent Kosovarian state the disintegration of the former Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia is now completed, and the EU has committed itself to support the future 
development of the new Balkan state. 
 
In some areas, the recognition of Kosovo can be compared to the acts of state 
recognition that followed the Yugoslavian civil war. In both cases, states were 
recognized as an exercise of strategic conflict management, and recognition was 
conditioned to the compliance of criteria defined by the EU. Nevertheless, all though 
similarities exist, the case of Kosovo is unique and represents a new use of state 
recognition:  
the recognition implicated an acceptance of Kosovarian secession from Serbia, and 
even though the EU has emphasized that the recognition of Kosovo was not to set 
precedent in similar cases, the act has encouraged separatist movementsand nations 
dreaming of secession. This was, for example, the case in Abhkazia and South 
Ossetia who claimed their independence in the period of time immediately after the 
Kosovarian declaration of independence.   
Although it can be argued that the Kosovo case does not set a precedent because of 
                                                
10  Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as Badinter Arbitration 
Committee) was a commission set up by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community on 
27 August 1991 to provide the Conference on Yugoslavia with legal advice 
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its exceptionalism, the recognition of Kosovo at least created an uncertainty 
regarding the existing practice of state recognition. This was further generated by the 
EU’s imposing of the entire ‘acquis communautaire’ as a precondition for 
recognition, while still claiming the act being in accordance with international law.    
 
For the EU as a regional leader, the recognition also holds interesting perspectives. 
By the European Parliament’s recommendation of conditional recognition, the EU 
once again proved itself to be more than the sum of its member states. The 
recommendation constitutes another step towards what can be perceived as a 
movement from statecentrism to institutionalism. State recognition is historically one 
of the core areas of the nation state, and the EU’s interference thus marks another 
step towards the convergence of foreign and security policies amongst the members 
of the Union.  
 
Kosovo has this day been recognized by 60 states (25 May 2009), by which the 
recognizing EU countries compose 22, indicating that the EU's endorsement of 
Kosovo is not representative for the international society as a whole. The UN’s 
lacking ability to articulate any common statement on the status of Kosovo, supports 
the neo-realistic definition of international politics as an outcome of world anarchy, 
defined as a lack of a central enforcement and higher authority. Kosovo, however, 
seems like a case for further analysis within both the liberal and realistic paradigm 
respectively. While the UN fails to fulfill its part in settling the future status of 
Kosovo, the EU has played an influential role and thus illustrates the limitations to 
studying Kosovo solely from the perspectives of state-to-state recognition or 
recognition through international central enforcement. Instead, a compromise 
between studies of politics on a state-to-state basis and international central 
enforcement is needed, for providing deeper insights into the process of state 
recognition. 
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